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COMMENTS
BACHELORS BEWARE: THE CURRENT VALIDITY
AND FUTURE FEASIBILITY OF A CAUSE OF ACTION
FOR BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

AND WHY GEORGIA SHOULD ABOLISH THE PSEUDO-CONTRACTUAL ACTION IN LIGHT OF
MODERN CASES SUCH AS SHELL V. GIBBS'

I.

INTRODUCTION

Heav'n has no Rage, like Love to Hatred turn'd,Nor Hell a Fury, like a Woman
scorn'd.
-William Congreve 2
3
On July 23, 2008, Rosemary Shell finally felt vindicated. After receiving a
$150,000 jury verdict against her former fianc6, she was satisfied that the legal system
was just. 4 Almost twelve months earlier in Georgia, Shell sued Wayne Gibbs, a man to
whom she was previously engaged, after he ended their engagement by leaving her a
note in the bathroom. 5 Believing he owed her for the emotional hardship and expenses
she incurred as a result of their broken engagement, she asked for pecuniary damages,
including damages for humiliation and mental anguish. 6 She took him to court and
withstood a three-day jury trial, offering testimony and evidence supporting her position
8
that Gibbs breached a binding contract. 7 And she won.
Under the common law claim of "breach of promise to marry," an individual may
10
recover damages 9 due to an unfulfilled future promise of marriage. The claim itself is

1. Since this article was completed, the case has been resolved and is not pending any appeal; Gibbs paid
Shell $150,000 in December of 2008. Stephen Gurr, Jilted Bride Case Over as Ex-fiance Pays Judgment of
12, 2008) (available at http://www.gainesvilletimes.com
$150,000, Gainesville Times (Dec.
/news/archive/12034/).
2. William Congreve, The Mourning Bride, in The Complete Plays of William Congreve 317, 361
(Herbert Davis ed., U. Chi. Press 1967).
3. Stephen Gurr, Jury Awards JiltedBride $150,000: Ex-fiancd Found in Breach of Contract, Gainesville
Times (July 23, 2008) (available at http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/news/archive/7296).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Pl.'s Compl. at 14, Shell v. Gibbs, No. 2007CV1638B (Ga. Super. July 23, 2008).
7. Gurr, supra n. 3.
8. Id.
9. Relief may include damages relating to social position, mental anguish, and humiliation. See Richard A.
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based on contract principles," but the available remedies resemble those of a tort
claim,12 creating what has come to be known as a "contort" 13: a combination of the two
principled areas of law to create a claim that is in itself a uniquely distinct cause of
action. 14
Although the cause of action has been prohibited by statute and judicial decision, 15
it still survives in many jurisdictions. Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia
have formally abolished the breach of marriage promise action,16 but the claim is
evidently still valid in twenty-two states through adoption and recognition of the
common law: Arizona,17 Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,18 Iowa, Kansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 19 and
Washington.
When evaluating restrictions on personal relationships under family law principles,
contract law principles, and general common law principles, it is relevant to note that the

Lord, Williston on Contracts vol. 23, § 62:27 (4th ed., Thomson Reuters 2008).
10. The claim "arises on the failure of one of the parties to perform according to the terms of the contract,
and if there has been a failure on the part of the defendant . . . and that failure has been treated by the other
party as a breach, a cause of action arises." Id. (footnote omitted).
11. Id. (citing Burnham v. Cornwell, 55 Ky. 284 (1855)).
12. Id (noting that "[a]lthough an action for breach of a contract to marry may be in the form of an action
on the contract, and is not generally considered to be a claim for injury arising from a tort or breach of
warranty, it is generally recognized that, with respect to the question of damages, it is actually in the nature of
an action in tort" (footnotes omitted)).
13. Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 98 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2d ed., Ohio St. U. Press 1995).
14. See id. at 95 ("Speaking descriptively, we might say that what is happening is that 'contract' is being
reabsorbed into the mainstream of 'tort'."). See generally id. at ch. IV.
15. See e.g. Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1999) (Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling that the cause
of action no longer exists); Vrabel v. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d 1298 (Ohio App. 1983) (discussing the state's "heart
balm" statute, which abolished the breach of a promise to marry action).
16. Alabama: Ala. Code § 6-5-330 (West 1975); Alaska: Harris v. Dragseth, 1994 WL 16459435 at *3
(Alaska Oct. 5, 1994) (apparently acknowledging that the action is not valid within Alaska: "The law does not
recognize some of the causes of action [plaintiff] raises, [including] breach of promise to marry . . .");
California: Cal. Civ. Code Ann. § 43.5 (West 1939); Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-202 (Lexis 2005);
Connecticut: Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-572b (1967); Delaware: Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 3924 (Lexis 2001);
District of Columbia: D.C. Code § 16-923 (West 2001); Florida: Fla. Stat. § 771.01 (2008); Indiana: Ind. Code
§ 34-12-2-1 (1999); Kentucky: Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d 772; Maine: 14 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 854 (2003);
Maryland: Md. Cts. and Jud. Proceedings Code Ann. § 5-801 (2008); Massachusetts: Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 207,
§ 47a (2007); Michigan: Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.2901 (2000); Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 553.03 (2000);
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. 27-1-602 (2007); Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.380 (2007); New Hampshire: N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 508:11 (West 2008); New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:23-1 (West 2000); New York: N.Y.
Civ. Rights § 80-a (McKinney 1992); North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 14-02-06 (2007); Ohio: Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2305.29 (West 1978); Pennsylvania: 23 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. § 1902 (2001); Utah: Jackson v.
Brown, 904 P.2d 685 (Utah 2995); Vermont: Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1001 (2008); Virginia: Va. Code Ann. §
8.01-220 (Lexis 2008); West Virginia: W.Va. Code § 56-3-2a (2008); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. § 768.01 (2001);
Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-23-101 (1977).
17. See e.g. Webb v. Gittlen, 174 P.3d 275, 277 n. 2 (Ariz. 2008) (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14-3110
(West 1974)) (apparently recognizing the claim as a valid cause of action because of its exclusion from the
survivability statute).
18. Damages have been limited by statute to actual damages only. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 15/1 (1948). See
Wildey v. Paulsen, 894 N.E.2d 862, 870 (Ill. App. I Dist. 2008) (discussing the damages limitation). Illinois'
previous statutory bar on breach of marriage promise actions was declared unconstitutional in Heck v. Shupp,
68 N.E.2d 464 (111. 1946).
19. Adams v. Big Three Indus., Inc., 549 S.W.2d 411, 416 (Tex. App. 1977) (apparently recognizing the
cause of action in Texas).
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value of marriage in our society is presumed to be extremely high 20 despite the elevated
level of divorce rates21 and the escalating controversy regarding the nature of a
marriage's legal construction (consider the volume of cases involving same-sex
marriages 22). Nevertheless, a marriage contract (at least between a consenting and able
combination of one man and one woman) is, and has always been, an enforceable
contract in the eyes of the law.23 States indisputably maintain discretion in policing the
marriage union,24 solidifying a relationship that symbolizes not only a social and moral
commitment, but a binding legal commitment, as well.25 The question currently raised is
whether our legal system should enforce a promise to marry in much the same way as a
traditional, commercial contract; or, does an engagement invite more leniency from basic
contract principles because of its very nature as a preparatory amorous period26 for the
unquestionably binding commitment of marriage?
Wayne Gibbs chose not to marry Rosemary Shell.27 And, as insensitive as that
decision may have been, it was his to make.28 Gibbs should not now be forced to explain
his choice in front of a jury or judge, no matter how aggrieved his ex-fianc6 feels; in fact,
forcing him to do so quite possibly violates his constitutional right to privacy.
Considering the recent jury verdict for Rosemary Shell, it is clear that the "breach of
promise to marry" cause of action is an old-fashioned legal outlet for punishing purely
personal decisions, and disregards the freedom that should be afforded to a non-married
20. See e.g. George P. Smith II, Family Values and the New Society: Dilemmas of the 21" Century 58-59
(Praeger Publishers 1998) (discussing the intersection of "traditional heterosexual marriage" with religion and
politics).
21. The most commonly cited statistic is that one in two marriages in the United States ends in divorce,
although this statistic could be misleading. See Dan Hurley, Divorce Rate: It's Not as High as You Think, N.Y.
Times (Apr. 19, 2005) (available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/19/health/19divo.html). The divorce rate
increased until the 1980's and is now slowly declining. Id.
22. Most recently, a California Supreme Court decision that overturned the state ban on gay marriage, and
the subsequent passage of Proposition 8, amending the California constitution to again prohibit same-sex
marriages. See Maura Dolan, California Supreme Court Overturns Gay MarriageBan, L.A. Times (May 15,
2008) (available at http://www.latimes.com/news/localla-me=gaymarriagel6-2008mayl6,1,4027698.story);
CNN, Los Angeles: No More Licenses for Same-sex Marriages, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/
11/05/state.laws/indexhtml#cnnSTCText (last updated November 6, 2008).
23. See e.g. I U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (statutorily defining the legal union of marriage) ("The word 'marriage'
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife.").
24. E.g. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d at 1305 ("[S]tate actions regulating marriage and its incidents are so
unassailably constitutional that only the quixotic would challenge them.").
25. There are, however, numerous issues related to the contractual relationship of a marriage contract, and
the validity of such agreements in relation to different types of partnerships. See generally 52 Am. Jur. 2d
Marriage§ 1, 4 (2008).
26. "[Marriages] must be approached with intelligent care and should not happen without a decent
assurance of success. When either party lacks that assurance, for whatever reason, the engagement should be
broken." Fierro v. Hoel, 465 N.W.2d 669, 672 (Iowa App. 1990) (adopting a no-fault approach when
determining ownership of an engagement ring); accord e.g. Curtis v. Anderson, 106 S.W.3d 251 (Tex. App.
2003) (case involving ownership of an engagement ring, explaining differing rationales in viewing the
ownership dilemma from a no-fault perspective). The court in Curtis explained,
(1) it is practically impossible for courts to determine 'fault' in the break-up of an engagement or
whether a particular break-up was justified; (2) engagements are meant to be a period of evaluation,
and a party shouldnot be penalizedfor ending a doomed relationship;and (3) the underlying public
policy favoring no-fault divorces should also apply to engagements.
Id. at 256 (emphasis added).
27. Pl.'s Compl., supran. 6.
28. Infra pt. IV (discussing the varying reasons that an individual like Gibbs should be free to make a
personal choice about marriage such as this).
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individual in his29 private romantic relationships with other capable and consenting
adults.
Beyond the clear distinctions from commercial contracts, strong public policy
arguments and substantial constitutional concerns over the fundamental right to privacy
demand abolition of this claim; its very existence poses a uniquely outdated and
somewhat sexist threat to the continued modernization of our legal system. This article
will discuss the makeup, evolution, and current presence of the claim, the application of
the claim's principles in Shell v. Gibbs, and the compelling reasons why the Georgia
courts or legislature, as well as other state systems, should abolish this antiquated cause
of action.
II.

A.

BEHIND THE BREACH: A BACKGROUND OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION

HistoricalRoots and the Classic Elements of the Claim

Through all these cases runs the doctrine, always recognized and frequently
applied,that the state, or society at large, is the thirdparty to every marriage contract.
30
-Witt v. Heyen
The breach of a promise to marry is uniquely entrenched in the common law
system in the United States; there are cases in state courts referencing the cause of action
as far back as 1792,31 while the earliest case involving a breach of promise claim in an
English common law court was in 1639's Stretcher v. Parker.32 It appears that the claim
began as exclusive to the English legal system and was not a principle shared with other
countries, specifically those with civil law schemes. 33 The cause of action was initially
established in America through the influence of its usage in the English common law
system. 3 4
In early English canon law, recovery on the claim allowed specific performance of
the contract only, and did not afford a litigant the right to seek damages; however, as the
older canon law was replaced with newer common law, the rights protected and available
remedies changed somewhat. 35 The transition of this claim to a common law claim
created damages in the form of ex delicto36 remedies, essentially tort remedies, while
still allowing the claim to retain its basic contract principles. 37 Early American courts
accepted the cause of action in this transformed state, albeit with slight hesitation,

29. Because of the nature of the cases, this article refers to the typical plaintiff as "she" and the typical
defendant as "he." Later portions of the article will discuss the inherent gender inequality regarding the cause
of action.
30. 221 P. 262, 266 (Kan. 1923).
31. Mott v. Goddard, 1792 WL 143 (Conn. 1792).
32. Harter F. Wright, The Action for Breach of the MarriagePromise, 10 Va. L. Rev. 361, 366 (1924).
33. Id. at 363.
34. Id. at 361.
35. Id at 364-365.
36. "1. Arising from a crime or tort <action ex delicto>. Although ex delicto refers most commonly to a tort
in modern usage, it referred historically to both torts and crimes." Black's Law Dictionary 608 (Bryan A.
Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004).
37. Wright, supra n. 32, at 365, 370.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss2/6

4

May: Bachelors Beware: The Current Validity and Future Feasibility of
2009

BACHELORS BEWARE

335

because of its use in England.38 In 1896, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the
argument that the right to recover for a breach of marriage promise must be born out of
statute, holding that, at least in the state of Georgia, the claim is a valid common law
cause of action, and its characteristics arise solely from common law traditions. 39
A promise to marry has been treated in the common law as analogous to other
types of contract and subject to the same conditions, including the right to recover for its
breach. 40 The marriage promise "contract" is subject to a valid offer and acceptance,
bound with consideration, and must be free of duress, fraud, or incapacity.41 However,
this action is not one that fits within the requirements for the statute of frauds, meaning
that a writing is not needed to establish the existence of a valid contract in this context. 4 2
As with any legal action, it is subject to the applicable statute of limitations. 4 3
Adequate consideration for a legally binding marriage agreement need not be
tangible; in fact, the mutual promise to commit to marriage has been declared sufficient
consideration. 44 Indeed, the real test is whether "the conduct and actions of the parties,
and the attendant circumstances, [is enough] to satisfy the jury that there was a serious
promise or offer of marriage accepted as such." 4 5 Additionally, there is no need to
specify a date or time of marriage, as long as the court determines the actual time period
to be reasonable.46 Even if all the elements of a valid contract are present, however, the
breach of marriage promise claim cannot be sustained if the marriage itself would have
been prohibited by statute. 4 7
Differing somewhat48 from the nature of commercial contracts, available remedies
are not limited to pecuniary damages, but, because of the special nature of this specific
contractual relationship, 49 a plaintiff may be awarded all of the damages that naturally
flow from the defendant's breach. 50 As further clarification, one court has explained,
rather imprecisely, that in the absence of special, financial damages, "no measure of
damages can be prescribed save the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors." 5 1 A
plaintiff may seek a multitude of damages, including "out-of-pocket expenses, personal
injuries such as mental and emotional suffering and illness, damage to reputation,
38. Id. at 366 ("In a great many American states it was at first gravely doubted whether the action was a
part of our law, but one by one the courts of the late colonies followed more or less reluctantly the example of
the mother country.").

39. Parkerv. Forehand,28 S.E. 400, 400 (Ga. 1896).
40. See generally 12 Am. Jur. 2d Breach ofPromise § 1 (2008).
41. Lord, supra n. 9 (citing Burnham, 55 Ky. 284).
42. Spence v. Carter,125 S.E. 883, 883 (Ga. App. 1924).
43. Lord, supra n. 9 (citing Burnham, 55 Ky. 284). There has, however, been confusion regarding which
statute of limitations to apply, since the cause of action is similar to both contract claims and tort claims. Harry
Cohen, Student Author, Obligations-Breach of Promiseto Marry, 24 Tul. L. Rev. 501, 504 (1950) (citations
omitted).
44. Schultz v. Duitz, 69 S.W.2d 27, 30 (Ky. 1934).
45. Burnham, 55 Ky. at 286.
46. Spence, 125 S.E. at 883.
47. Witt, 221 P. at 266 (citing Campbell v. Crampton, 2 F. 417 (N.D.N.Y. 1880); Reed v. Reed, 32 N.E. 750
(Ohio 1892)).
48. See Parker, 28 S.E. at 400 (briefly discussing the differences in remedies between the breach of a
promise to marry and the breach of a commercial contract).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 401.
5 1. Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2009

5

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 45 [2009], Iss. 2, Art. 6
336

TULSA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 45:331

humiliation, embarrassment, 'loss of worldly advantage' (expectation of sharing
defendant's wealth, social position, home, and other marital incidents), and punitive
damages." 52
Traditional defenses to a breach of marriage contract resemble those of any other
contractual breach, 53 but there are additional defenses peculiar to this cause of action.
These defenses include: an unchaste character of the plaintiff that was unknown to the
defendant at the time of the proposal54 (sometimes classified as a "misrepresentation" 55),
an inability to marry because the defendant was already married (and this was made
known to the plaintiff),56 certain hereditary conditions and diseases,57 and, in some
cases, evidence of cohabitation before marriage.58
In 1951, the Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld a jury instruction on a defense
which provided that a breach of a marriage promise would be justified if, after the
promise to marry, "the plaintiff conducted herself in such a manner as would cause a
reasonably prudent man to believe that she was guilty of immoral conduct with others
than the defendant,"59 inserting the vague requirement of chastity as an implied element
of successful recovery.60 While the court acknowledged that that the behavior under
review was subsequent to the marriage promise, it did not define "immoral conduct," nor
did it require actual proof of the alleged conduct, merely a reasonable belief by the
defendant. 6 1
Even more directly, in 1965 The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed and clarified the
existence of this defense when it clearly stated as a "general rule that illicit intercourse of
the plaintiff prior to the promise to marry . .. unknown to the defendant, is a defense ...
since it violates the implied representation by the promisee that she is chaste." 62 There is
also authority for the proposition that a plaintiffs mere bad reputation, even if falsely
grounded, will serve as a complete defense. 63
52. HeartbalmStatutes and Deceit Actions, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1770, 1774 (1985) (citing Menhusen v. Dake,
334 N.W.2d 435, 436 (Neb. 1983); Bradley v. Somers, 322 S.E.2d 665, 666-667 (S.C. 1984), among others).
53. Lord,supran.9.
54. E.g. Coombs v. Fazzio, 386 S.W.2d 650,652 (Tex. 1965); accord Barrettv. Vander-Meulen, 94 S.W.2d
983 (Ky. App. 1936), overruled, Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d 772 (determining the trial court's refusal to admit
evidence of plaintiffs unchaste nature before the marriage promise to be reversible error in a common law
breach of marriage promise case) (the case was subsequently nullified when the cause of action was prohibited
by the Kentucky Supreme Court).
55. Coombs, 386 S.W.2d at 650.
56. Thorpe v. Collins, 263 S.E.2d 115, 117 (Ga. 1980).
57. Cohen, supra n. 43, at 503-504 (citing Van Houten v. Morse, 38 N.E. 705 (Mass. 1894) (actionable
defense when there was alleged concealment of an existence of negro blood in plaintiffs biological makeup);
Shepler v. Chamberlain, 197 N.W. 372, 375 (Mich. 1924) (not allowing defendant's lip cancer to constitute a
defense, but noting that "where [a] defendant without his fault after the engagement develops an incurable,
communicable disease which affects his ability to perform his marital duty, or which renders marital relations
impossible without communicating the disease to his spouse or their offspring, such fact operates as a
justification of the breach"); Winders v. Powers, 9 S.E.2d 131, 132 (N.C. 1940) (in a discussion on the effect of
plaintiffs syphilis on the breach of promise action, determining that a bodily condition like a sexuallytransmitted disease which affects the future children of the couple will render a defense for the defendant).
58. Menhusen, 334 N.W.2d at 436-437.
59. Roberts v. Van Cleave, 237 P.2d 892, 896 (Okla. 1951).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Coombs, 386 S.W.2d at 652 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
63. Morgan v. Yarborough, 1850 WL 3801 at *9 (La. Apr. 1850).
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A claim for breach of promise of marriage will be barred either if the plaintiff is
married or if the plaintiff knew the defendant was married at the time of the proposal;
conversely, a hidden marriage of the defendant is enough to sustain a valid contract.64 A
post-engagement, continuing relationship between the parties after the discovery of the
unknown marriage, but before the contractual breach, will not ultimately bar the plaintiff
from recovery, although it may play a factor in determining damages. 65
While scholarly commentators have argued over the classification of a marriage
promise as a legally sufficient contract,66 urging that such an agreement is "social and
not legal ... [and] the nature of the agreement is not one of bargain and sale," 67 the law
continues to recognize this promise as a valid contract when all the basic contract
requirements are met. 68 Because of this common law recognition and its anomalous
character,69 the action has been barred by statute and judicial common law in a majority
of jurisdictions. 70
B.

"Anti-HeartBalm "Acts andJudicialAbolishment

The breach of a marriage promise claim and other, similar claims, including
alienation of affections (liability for procuring the affections of another's spouse 71) and
criminal conversation (liability for having an affair with another's spouse 72), have been
grouped together as so-called "heart balm" actions, and have been barred in twenty-nine
jurisdictions. 73
Although the actions can be abolished by judicial common law, 74 they are most
often barred through legislation that has come to be known as "anti-heart balm" 75
statutes.76 The first "anti-heart balm" statute was introduced in 1935 by Roberta West
Nicholson, the only female member of Indiana's legislature. 77 Her apparent motivation
in introducing the statute was to curb the bad reputation such actions had due to the fear
that they were only used for blackmail purposes.7 8 As the Ohio Court of Appeals later
noted, "[anti-] [h]eart balm statutes, though the wording and reach may differ from state
to state, were passed to put an end to what were seen as gross abuses of court process
arising from romantic relationships or, perhaps more accurately, arising from the acerbity

64. Leonardv. Owen, 186 S.E.2d 506, 507 (Ga. 1971).
65. Id.
66. E.g. Wright, supran. 32, at 367.
67. Id. (emphasis omitted).
68. Lord, supra n. 9.
69. Wright, supra n. 32, at 370.
70. Supra n. 16.
71. See e.g. Brown v. Strum, 350 F. Supp. 2d 346, 349 (D. Conn. 2004) (citing Lombardi v. Bockholdt, 355
A.2d 270, 271 (Conn. 1974)).
72. See e.g. id.
73. Supra n. 16.
74. See Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 776.
75. In some cases, theses statutes are referred to as "heart balm" statutes, although the meaning appears to
be the same. E.g. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d at 1301.
76. Recent Cases-Dailyv. Parker, 13 U. Chi. L. Rev. 362, 376 (1945).
77. Id
78. Id.
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of cooled ones." 79
Other states quickly followed in crafting legislation patterned after Indiana's, 80
and, since their enactment, the constitutionality of these statutes has occasionally been
challenged81 on due process considerations.82 However, when faced with such a
challenge, courts have routinely upheld the legislation as a constitutional exercise of the
state's inherent power to regulate marriage.83 A due process challenge to the New York
"anti-heart balm" statute failed in 1937 in Hanfgarn v. Mark84 when the New York
Court of Appeals upheld the statute on the grounds that it was within the state's domain
to police all aspects of the marriage relationship.85 Scholars have urged that these "antiheart balm" acts ". . . [affect] only incidents of the marital relationship, a field clearly

within the domain of the state legislature." 86
In Hanfgarn, the court also addressed a state constitutional issue; namely, whether
the cause of action could be abolished when it existed prior to the enactment of the state
constitution, which provided an express protection for existing common law actions.88
The New York court held that if the challenged common law action could not
constitutionally be abolished, it would "result in a stagnation of law,"8 9 and went on to
note that the state constitution must allow the legislature power to "correc[t] an evil
growing out of the marriage relation by altering the provisions of the common law."90
Although the majority of courts addressing the issue have uniformly upheld "antiheart balm" statutes against constitutional challenges, 9 1 at least a few courts have
expressed concerns about the issue.92 A Pennsylvania district court argued in 1942 that
Pennsylvania's "anti-heart balm" statute divested a "fundamental" 93 common law right
to bring a heart balm action, and possibly implicated due process concerns. 94 The "antiheart balm" legislation at issue also included a penal provision, making it a misdemeanor
for any person to file, or threaten to file, one of the prohibited actions. 95 The court found

79. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d at 1301.
80. Recent Cases, supra n. 76, at 376.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. E.g. Langdon v. Sayre, 168 P.2d 57 (Cal. App. 1946); Goldberg v. Musim, 427 P.2d 698, 703 (Colo.
1967); Rotwein v. Gersten, 36 So.2d 419, 421 (Fla. 1948); Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d at 1305 (holding that there is no
fundamental right to bring an amatory action such as for a breach of promise to marry, and that it is clearly
within the state's powers to regulate the marital relationship); but see Heck, 68 N.E.2d 464 (Illinois Supreme
Court's ruling that the 'Heart Balm' Act was contrary to the state's constitution because of an inconsistency
between the title of the act and its purpose, as well as in the divestment of the common law right of recovery).
84. 8 N.E.2d 47 (N.Y. 1937).
85. Recent Cases,supra n.76, at 376 (citing Hanfgarn,8 N.E.2d 47).
86. Id. at 377 (citing Maynardv. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888)).
87. Hanfgard,8 N.E.2d at 48.
88. Id (discussing the constitution of New York, which provided that "such parts of the common law ...
shall be and continue the law of this State, subject to such alterations as the Legislature shall make concerning
the same." (quoting N.Y. Const. art. I, § 16)).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Supran.83.
92. Wilder v. Reno, 43 F. Supp. 727, 728 (M.D. Pa. 1942).
93. Id.
94. Id
95. Id at 727.
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this to be the most doubtful and "obnoxious" component of the statute.96 Although the
court expressed these concerns over the constitutionality of the statute, the comments
were mere dicta, and not controlling.9 7
While the Pennsylvania court's analysis did not effectively eliminate the "antiheart balm" statute, a 1946 holding from the Illinois Supreme Court did strike down the
prohibitory legislation as unconstitutional.98 In that case, the statute was considered to be
contrary to the state constitution because the title of the act did not clearly reflect its
purpose (as required by the constitution) and because it divested a constitutionallyprescribed right to recover damages for wrongs committed. 99
A federal district court in Illinois was also faced with a challenge to the same
statute; that court determined the legislation to be unconstitutional as well, primarily due
to the fact that the Illinois' law created only criminal punishment for the filing of a heart
balm action, and did not specifically abolish the actions. 10 0 In support for its position,
the court referred to a 1937 holding from the Indiana Supreme Court, which upheld the
section of the Indiana "anti-heart balm" statute that abolished the causes of action but
declared the section making it a crime to file such an action unconstitutional. 10 1 The
breach of marriage promise action is still valid in Illinois, although damages have been
limited by statute to actual damages.1 02
With the existence of prohibitory "anti-heart balm" legislation, some brokenhearted would-be plaintiffs have attempted to use other causes of action to obtain a
remedy.' 0 3 Unfortunately for these plaintiffs, "anti-heart balm" statutes cannot be
circumvented using a claim of emotional distress or fraud when the underlying conduct
would traditionally have been subject to a breach of promise suit. 104 A district court in
Connecticut observed that where the underlying factual situation would require using a
claim that had been abolished, the action cannot proceed, even when the actual claim
being alleged is still a valid cause of action.105 A Maryland court directly addressed the
issue, resolving concisely, "we are bound to apply the statute liberally to ensure that it is
not being circumvented by artful pleading and artful framing of other causes of
action." 1 06 These decisions should not be construed to mean that every action involving
a marriage promise is barred, as one court has acknowledged that when the cause of
action is not based on the actual marriage promise but is merely associated with it, as in
the recovery of property after the dissolution of a relationship, the prohibitory statute will
not apply.10 7
96. Id. at 728.
97. Wilder, 43 F. Supp. at 729.
98. Heck, 68 N.E.2d at 466. A federal district court in Illinois also declared the statute unconstitutional in
1945. Daily v. Parker,61 F. Supp. 701 (C.D. 111.1945).
99. Heck, 68 N.E.2d at 466.
100. Daily, 61 F. Supp at 702.
101. Id. at 703 (citing Pennington v. Stewart, 10 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. 1937)).
102. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 15/1.
103. See Brown v. Strum, 350 F. Supp. 2d 346, 350 (D. Conn. 2004).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Miller v. Ratner, 688 A.2d 976, 989-990 (D. Md. 1997).
107. Lampus v. Lampus, 660 A.2d 1308, 1310 (Pa. 1995) ("The Heart Balm Act was interpreted to eliminate
only those actions for breach of contract to marry. It does not extend to all causes of action for the recovery of
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There has been, however, some question as to the interpretation and scope of these
statutes, specifically in reference to purposeful, deceitful promises to marry and
fraudulent actions as inducement to these promises.108 As summarized in a 1985 article
that analyzed whether willful and deceitful conduct should be included within the
judicial interpretation of "anti-heart balm" legislation,
courts disagree .. . on whether a party may recover damages for injury from
a willful, fraudulent marriage promise. Fearful of the reintroduction of the
abuses associated with breach of promise to marry actions, many courts and
commentators have interpreted the heartbalm statutes to bar suits in deceit
on a fraudulent marriage promise. 109
While it appears that there is still somewhat of an open question of interpretation in
the courts, the more recent trend of decisions seems to exclude clearly fraudulent and
deceitful actions from within the realm of barred complaints under the "anti-heart balm"
legislation.1 10
C.

The Cause ofAction's History and Application in Georgia

In Georgia, the breach of a promise of marriage has always been subject to the
same elements as originally ascertained in the general common law realm; specifically,
proof of the existence of a binding contract and evidence of its breach,111 which can
essentially be established "by the observed conduct of the parties or their admissions."ll2
The action was recognized in Georgia as far back as 1859, when the Georgia Supreme
Court decided that this contract cause of action was subject to an attachment in Morton v.
Pearman.113 The court noted that the "demand arising from the breach of a promise of
1 14
marriage . . . is a demand for money."

It was decided twenty years later in 1879 that a breach of a marriage promise

property based on breach of a contract to marry or all the actions resulting from the breach of contract.").
108. HeartbalmStatutes, supran. 52, at 1772-1773.
109. Id. (footnotes omitted). In the omitted footnotes, the author cites ample authority for her summary of
this interpretation, including A.B. v. C.D., 36 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Thorpe, 263 S.E.2d 115; Waddell v.
Briggs, 381 A.2d 1132 (Me. 1978); and, taking an opposite view (that deceit actions lie outside the statutory
bar): Boyd v. Boyd, 228 Cal. App. 2d 374 (1964); Perthus v. Paul,58 S.E.2d 190 (Ga. App. 1950).
110. E.g. Albinger v. Harris,48 P.3d 711 (Mont. 2002) (noting that the Montana statute, Mont. Code Ann. §
27-1-602 (1963), specifically protects deceit actions as outside the legislative bar); Turner v. Shavers, 645
N.E.2d 1324, 1325 (Ohio App. 1994) (holding that there is no immunity to an individual who commits fraud,
and that the Ohio prohibitory statute does not "bar a claim for fraud merely because the fraudulent
misrepresentation involves an intention to marry"); see also Lampus, 600 A.2d at 1310 (noting that deceitful
action is not protected by the statute in relation to claims of property, but that deceitful marriage promise
actions alone are still barred when there is prohibitory legislation: "the [Pennsylvania] Act does not extend
protection to an individual who deceitfully uses the promise to marry to deprive another of his property"); but
see Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 106 Cal. App. 4th 257, 267 (citing Boyd, 228 Cal. App. 2d 374;
Smith v. Pust, 19 Cal. App. 4th 263 (1993)) (determining that the California statute bars all claims arising out
of facts that would amount to a barred heart balm theory); MN. v. D.S., 616 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Minn. App.
2000) (interpreting the Minnesota statute, Minn. Stat. § 553.01, to prohibit all actions based on the underlying
factual situation of a breach of marriage promise, and prohibiting the claim of fraud in this instance when the
alleged fraud was a fraudulent promise to marry: "Minnesota law not only bars specific claims for breach of a
promise to marry, it also bars any other claim for damages that is predicated on a promise to marry").
111. E.g. Graves v. Rivers, 51 S.E. 318, 320 (Ga. 1905).
112. Id.
113. 28 Ga. 323 (1859).
114. Id.
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cannot exist after a plaintiff's, or potential plaintiff s, death; analogously, a plaintiff will
lose the right to recover for damages on this claim when she marries the defendant (who
115
In justifying the termination of the
had previously committed the alleged breach).
action upon death, the court declared that the "action is for a personal wrong, and,
though on breach of contract, it is a personal action, and would not survive to the
personal representative." 1 1 6 In dicta, that court opined on the importance of marriage
within the state of Georgia when it observed that "the whole spirit and the policy of our
law favors marriage, voluntary marriage, and all contracts militating against it . . . are
null and void."1 17
In the later case of Spence et al. v. Carter,the Georgia Court of Appeals described
exceptions to the general rule that the action does not survive the death of either the
plaintiff or defendant: 1 18 under common law principles, the cause of action will survive
death either if the legislature has crafted a specific statutell9 allowing for survival of the
claim, or if there are special, financial damages requiring the claim to continue to the
decedent's estate. 120 The court went on to note that the special damages alleged must be
damage to property as opposed to mere personal damages.121 The court did not
ultimately determine whether the exceptions were even recognized under Georgia
common law,122 however, because it held that, under the facts alleged, neither would
apply anyway.123
As in the general common law ambit, the Georgia Supreme Court has also
recognized the tort nature of remedies available under this cause of action, and that
damages "may include full compensation for the pain, mortification, and wounded
1 24
feelings suffered . .. in consequence of the dishonorable conduct of the defendant."
Although the Georgia courts have apparently never expressed doubt about the validity of
the claim, its presence in the state's high courts is relatively limited. 125 Recent cases
affirm the cause of action without significant evolution or discussion. 126 A 2001 case
before the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the plaintiff's claim for breach of
promise to marry,127 affirming the trial court's decision to ignore the claim, noting that
128
there was no evidence the defendant had ever made a promise to marry the plaintiff,

115. Harris v. Tison, 63 Ga. 629, 630 (1879).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Spence, 125 S.E. at 883.
119. Id. (citations omitted).
120. Id.
121. Id
122. Id. at 884.
123. Spence, 125 S.E. at 884.
124. Graves, 51 S.E. at 320 (citing Parker,28 S.E. 400).
125. Gurr, supra n. 3. In the past ten years, there are evidently only four recorded cases of the claim rising to
a high court in Georgia: Folds v. Barber,632 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. App. 2006); Finch v. Dasgupta, 555 S.E.2d 22
(Ga. App. 2001); Phillips v. Blankenship, 554 S.E.2d 231 (Ga. App. 2001); Fieldv. Massey, 502 S.E.2d 349
(Ga. App. 1998). Search in Westlaw, ga-cs-all library, using the search "breach & 'marriage promise' " (Nov.
28, 2008) (yielding 23 results).
126. E.g. Folds, 632 S.E.2d 403.
127. Finch, 555 S.E.2d 22.
128. Id.
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an overwhelmingly significant element of the claim. 129 The court quickly and succinctly
analyzed the issue, determining, "[b]y the very nature of the action, there must be an
to marry and acceptance of that promise before one can be held liable for
actual promise
13 0
a breach."
Another 2001 case in the same court affirmed a decision for the plaintiff on her
breach of promise to marry claim (as a counterclaim to her ex-fianc6's complaint that she
improperly withdrew money from a mutual account).131 The court affirmed the trial
court's judgment of approximately $2,500, specifically determined to be debts incurred
as a result of the canceled wedding.132 The plaintiffs recovery was limited due to the
allegations against her of financial impropriety. 133
III. SHELL V. GIBBS

There is a good way to break up with someone, and it doesn't include a post-it.
-Sex and the City1 34
A.

Backdrop of the Case

The modem-day scarcity of the claim 135 is what makes Rosemary Shell's lawsuit
so disquieting when viewed in light of the large verdict she received at trial, 136 and the
factual elements of this case are a classic example of he said, she said. 137 The arguments
played out in a three-day trial to a Hall County, Georgia jury of six women and six men,
with Shell's story ultimately being the persuasive one.138
1.

She Said

Rosemary Shell claimed that she was in a relationship with Wayne Gibbs as early
as July of 1991, which continued for about fifteen years. 139 In July of 2006, she decided
to end their relationship because Gibbs had not yet proposed.140 After this termination of
the relationship, Shell moved to Pensacola, Florida, where she took a human resources
jobl41 with an annual salary of $81,000.142
In November of that same year, just a few months after Shell accepted the job in
Florida, Gibbs visited her and proposed, offering her a 2-carat diamond engagement

129. Lord, supran. 9.
130. Finch, 555 S.E.2d at 24 (citing Leonard, 186 S.E.2d 506).
131. Phillips,554 S.E.2d at 232-233.
132. Id. at 233.
133. Id. at 232.
134. Sex and the City, "The Post-it Always Sticks Twice" (HBO Aug. 3, 2003) (TV series).
135. Gurr, supran. 3.
136. Verdict, Shell v. Gibbs, No. 2007CV1638B (Ga. Super July 23, 2008).
137. See infra pt. m(A)(1-2).
138. Gurr, supran. 3.
139. Pl.'s Compl., supra n. 6, at 2, 13.
140. Id. at 14.
141. Bob Considine, Jilted Bride Calls $150,000 Jury Award 'Justice', http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/25846393/ (last accessed August 25, 2008).
142. PI.'s Compl., supra n. 6, at T 5.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss2/6

12

May: Bachelors Beware: The Current Validity and Future Feasibility of
BACHELORS BEWARE

2009

343

ring, 143 which she accepted. 144 They decided to get married soon after. In order to
facilitate the engagement, and due to discussions between the two, Shell quit her job and
moved back to Georgia on November 11, 2006.145 Shell's current job at North Georgia
College and State University pays $31,000 a year.146
Just a few days before the agreed-upon wedding date of December 2, Gibbs
informed his fianc6e that he was canceling the wedding (but not the relationship) by
leaving a note in the bathroom of their shared residence.147 They continued to date, and
Gibbs continued to discuss marriage with friends and family, as well as with Shell
herself, when, in January of that winter, Gibbs helped Shell move out. 148
Shell moved into her own apartment, where she claims Gibbs stayed most of the
time. 149 Just two months later, at the end of March 2007, Gibbs admitted to Shell that he
needed more time, and was going to take this opportunity to decide what he wanted to do
in regards to marriage. 150 In April, Shell discovered that Gibbs had been seeing another
woman. 15 1
Shell claimed to have relied on Gibbs' proposal when relocating from Florida, and
laments the lost opportunity she had to marry other men during the time she continued
seeing Gibbs.152 According to her claim, she experienced mental suffering, wounded
pride, humiliation, and impaired health.153 She also claimed that her financial reliance on
the engagement forced her to file for bankruptcy and damaged her credit history. 154 This
issue was strongly contested by Gibbs, and became the basis of his countersuit. 15 5
2.

He Said

Gibbs made no attempt to deny the proposal or breached promise, but instead made
allegations against Shell that he was misled before making that promise.156 In
contradiction to Shell, Gibbs claimed their relationship began in 2001, an odd ten-year
143. Considine, supra n. 141. Shell has said that she will sell the engagement ring, although she does not
know its exact value. Id. The ownership of an engagement ring is an issue in and of itself, with very specific
legal guidelines and precedent, and, as it was not an issue in the original case tried between Shell and Gibbs,
this article does not analyze the legal implications of property rights and ownership of the ring. For information
and background regarding engagement ring ownership, see generally Adam D. Glassman, I Do! Or Do I? A
PracticalGuide to Love, Courtship, and Heartbreakin New York-or-Who Gets the Ring Back Following a
Broken Engagement? 12 Buff. Women's L. J. 47 (2004) (discussing property rights to an engagement ring in
the state of New York); Elaine Marie Tomko, Rights in Respect of Engagement and Courtship Presents when
MarriageDoes Not Ensue, 44 A.L.R. 5th 1 (1996). For a brief description on Shell's ownership of the ring, see
Stephen Gurr, 'JiltedBride' Case: Ex-fiancd Wants a New Trial: Wayne Gibbs Alleges Fraud Regarding
Engagement Ring, Gainesville Times (Sept. 3, 2008) (available at http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/
news/archive/8425/.
144. Pl.'s Compl., supra n. 6, at y6.
145. Id. at 18.
146. Considine, supra n. 141.
147. Pl.'s Compl., supra n. 6, at T 9.
148. Id. at 112.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 13.
151. Id. at 14.
152. Pl.'s Compl., supra n. 6, at 17.
153. Id. at 122.
154. Id.
155. Def.'s Ans. and Counterclaim, Shell v. Gibbs, No. 2007CV1638B (Ga. Super July 19, 2008).
156. Id. at 5.
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discrepancy. 157 He also claimed that he proposed thinking that she had only $30,000
worth of debt, while he later came to find that she owed much more, and that she had
materially misrepresented the state of her credit history and financial well-being.158
Gibbs admitted that Shell moved out after he terminated the engagement, but denied
staying at her new apartment most of the time. 159 He also denies seeing another woman
while they were together, and maintains that Shell merely discovered him in the presence
of another woman after the relationship had ended. 160
Gibbs says he chose to lawfully end the engagement because Shell misrepresented
her financial status and he was unwilling to take on such debt pursuant to a legal
marriage.161 He claims that her bankruptcy problems are hers alone, and he in no way
induced her into financial hardship.162 Gibbs asked the court to deny Shell's claim and
instead grant him relief for the money he expended in helping to pay off her debts, a total
of over $40,000.163 He did not ask for the engagement ring back in his counterclaim,
and, after the lawsuit ended, Shell put it up for sale on the Internet for $15,000. 164
Shell acknowledged that she had an overall debt of almost $42,000, but maintained
As she told The Today Show's
that Gibbs was always aware of her financial status.
discussed
my debts before I left
Meredith Vieira a few days after the verdict, "we
Florida. We discussed my debts when I came back from Florida. He had a list. He knew
exactly what I owed. That's all just kind of a smokescreen."166 The jury apparently
7
agreed with her. 16
B.

Outcome of the Case andIts CurrentStatus

On July 23, 2008, the jury handed down a unanimous verdict.168 They found for
Shell in the amount of $150,000 of unspecified damages. 169 The court entered judgment
on August 4 against Gibbs, once again recognizing the breach of promise to marry as a
modernly valid cause of action in Georgia. 17 0
On August 29, less than a month after a verdict was entered against him, Gibbs
filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was contrary to law and was
strongly against the weight of the evidence. 17 1 Most of Gibbs' argument rests on Shell's
debt and bankruptcy proceedings; he claims that the verdict was a product of fraud, in
that Shell did not disclose the value of the engagement ring and the lawsuit against him
157. Id. at12.
158. Id.at 8.
159. Id. at 12.
160. Def.'s Ans., supran. 155, at 14.
161. Id. at 115.
162. Id at 17.
163. Id. at $ 5 (counterclaim).
164. Gurr, supra n. 143.
165. Considine, supran. 141.
166. Id. (quoting Rosemary Shell during an interview on The Today Show (NBC July 25, 2008) (TV Broad.)
(interview available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/25846190#25846190)).
167. Id.
168. Verdict, supra n. 136.
169. Id.
170. Judgm., Shell v. Gibbs, No. 2007CV1638B (Ga. Super Aug. 4,2008).
171. Def.'s Mot. for a New Tr., Shell v. Gibbs, No. 2007CV1638B (Ga. Super Aug. 29, 2008).
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to her creditors and in the bankruptcy proceedings against her. 172 He alleges that Shell
was legally required to disclose the actual value of the ring and the existence of the civil
suit to the bankruptcy court in proceedings based on her debt, which had begun about six
months before she sued him (he argues that she was required to amend the bankruptcy
filings to reflect possible civil awards and the value of her jewelry).1 73 He also contends
that her bankruptcy could not have resulted from his breach of promise, noting the
money he expended to pay off her debts and the value of the engagement ring, which she
kept. 174 His argument is that the judgment cannot stand as a matter of equity and judicial
preservation. 175 As of this writing, the court has not addressed these issues. 176
Gibbs' motion for a new trial focuses on his defenses, the sufficiency of the
evidence presented, and the possibility of fraud on the part of Shell. 177 Gibbs did not,
however, attack the verdict with the argument that the court should clearly repudiate the
entire cause of action. 178
Although the majority of states have banned the cause of action by statute,1 7 9 a
state's high court also has the power to change this common law claim. 180 In 1999, the
Kentucky Supreme Court did just that.181 A lower state court in Kentucky had
previously granted a motion for summary judgment on behalf of the defendant based on
the non-viability of the breach of marriage promise claim, and the Court of Appeals
reversed, noting that they had no discretion to ignore precedent (which had been clearly
established for the claim in Kentucky).182 The highest court in the state noted their
specific authority to modify or abolish existing common law claims and emphasized the
fact that there were alternative options to recovery for potential plaintiffs still in place,
such as breach of contract or intentional infliction of emotional distress. 183 Options for
modernizing the law in Georgia lay either in careful judicial consideration by the
Georgia Supreme Court on appeall 8 4 or an independent act by the state legislature; 185
Part IV of this article lays out the varying reasons for abolishing this apparently rarelyused cause of action. 186

172. Def.'s Br. in Support of Mot. for New Tr. at 4, Shell v. Gibbs, No. 2007CV1638B (Ga. Super Aug. 29,
2008).
173. Id. at 5-7.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 6-7.
176. As of November 11, 2008, Gibbs had tried his motion, but the court had not yet made a decision.
Telephone call with the Hall County Court Clerk's Office (Nov. 11, 2008).
177. See Def.'s Br., supra n. 172.
178. Id
179. Supra n. 16 (twenty-six of the twenty-eight states that have abolished the cause of action have done so
by statute).
180. See e.g. Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d 772 (Kentucky Supreme Court's ruling that breach of promise to marry
was no longer valid in the state).
181. Id. at 776.
182. Id at 773.
183. Id. at 776.
184. See Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d 772.
185. Supra n. 16 (a listing of state statutes that have effectively abolished the breach of marriage promise
cause of action).
186. Gurr, supra n. 3.
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IV. THE OLD BALL AND CHAIN: THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION AND
WHY THE GEORGIA LEGISLATURE OR COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER ABOLISHMENT
It is common knowledge ... that in this modern age marriage is consideredfrom a
businesspoint of view as much so as a status or companionship.
-Schultz v. Duitz
Although the above sentiment makes legal considerations easier to classify, a
compelling argument presents itself in favor of distinguishing romantic decisions from
business agreements and providing more leniency in their enforcement.188 Existing and
historical arguments for the abolition of this common law cause of action include fear of
the all-too-"enterprising" female,189 sexual discrimination in litigation,190 public policy
considerations,191 and personal freedom of choice. 192 In analyzing the possible effects of
Shell v. Gibbs on the future viability of the breach of promise to marry in Georgia, it is
important to consider the modernly applicable arguments favoring its abolition. 193 In
addition, it is necessary to examine the relatively weakl94 arguments supporting the
action in order to determine its necessity, or futility,195 in a modem legal system.
A.

Why TraditionalContractPrinciplesas Applied to EngagementsJust Don't Cut It

There exists a current and ongoing conflict between commercial law principles and
family law principles.196 Attempting to classify familial arrangements solely in the
context of commercial regulations creates a much-"too simplistic" model for dispute
resolution.197 While contract law may be beneficial and, at times, necessary, in legal
disputes over family and personal relationships, it is also essential to relax contract law
standards in order to accommodate such sensitive subjects. 19 8
The real problem with using traditional contract principles to create a cause of
action for the slighted fianc6 is that an engagement cannot be viewed as a traditional
contract. 199 Just the opposite, an engagement must be thought of more as an emotional,
or even social, attachment than a binding legal contract. 200 It has been argued that the
cause of action creates a binding agreement between the parties only after there has been
a breach of it, with the implication being that the law creates an enforceable contract

187. 69 S.W.2d at 30.
188. E.g. Wright, supran. 32, at 367-370.
189. Id. at 378.
190. Gilbert,987 S.W.2d at 775; Wright, supran. 32, at 377-379.
191. E.g. Gilbert,987 S.W.2d at 775.
192. E.g. Jackson, 904 P.2d at 687.
193. Infrapt. IV(A-C).
194. Gilbert,987 S.W.2d at 775-776.
195. See id. at 775.
196. Smith, supran. 20, at 27-28 (discussing the conflict between contract law and family law regarding the
issue of surrogacy).
197. Id. at 28.
198. Id.
199. See Wright, supra n. 32, at 368.
200. Id. at 367-369.
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20 1
One proponent
when the parties did not initially intend to create one for themselves.
of this argument has offered as a hypothetical example the idea that no currently engaged
couple would consider the possibility of suing the other in the event their relationship
were to end.202 It must be, then, that the parties understand the "contract" to be legally
binding only upon its breach. 2 03 Following this logic, a distinction must be made
2 04
between commercial contracts and promises to marry on the basis of intent.
If the underlying theme of contract law and enforcement of equitable agreements is
the idea of a free marketplace and a bargained-for exchange,205 an agreement based, not
on a bargain for sale, but on a lifelong commitment to a marriage, does not fit neatly
within the anticipated parameters of intent. 206 If contracts are considered enforceable and
binding because the parties who create the contract have the opportunity to "deal with
each other 'at arm's length,' "207 with full knowledge of the exchange being offered, it is
necessary to distinguish a promise to marry because of the unavoidable emotional
influences on the decision-maker. 20 8 It is likely that emotions will cloud the neutrality of
the agreement, rendering a promise to marry almost the complete opposite of an
impartial, bargained-for contract. 2 09 Additionally, not only will emotions cloud the
formation of the agreement,210 they will also muddy the factual elements, evidence, and
extent of damages, as in Shell v. Gibbs.2 11
Another important difference between marriage agreements and traditional
contracts is the authority of the state; private parties generally do not need state approval
or authorization for a commercial contract, but a state has the sole authority to provide
for a marriage "contract" between two individuals.212 In 1971, the United States
Supreme Court used this reasoning as an argument for allowing free access to the courts
in order to obtain a divorce.213 The Court noted that individuals are free to create, and
breach, commercial contracts at their own will, but "private citizens may [not] covenant
2 14
This plenary power of a state
for or dissolve marriages without state approval."
distinguishes marriage contracts from other contracts, which presumably only require
2 15
state intervention at the request of either party to the contract.
Most courts have taken the view that marriage itself is something more than
merely a traditional contract.216 The Supreme Court, in 1888, discussed the classification
of marriage as uniquely and fundamentally more important than the classification of

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 367-368.
Id. at 367.
Id
Wright, supra n. 32, at 368.
E.g. Gilmore, supra n. 13, at ch. 1.
See id.; Wright, supra n. 32, at 368.
Wright, supra n. 32, at 368.
Id.
Id
Id
Supra pt. III.
Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
Id.
Id.
Id.
E.g. Maynard, 125 U.S. at 210.
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traditional contracts, noting that "[marriage] is an institution ... which in its purity the
public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would be neither civilization nor progress.'217 While the legal status of
marriage cannot be challenged,218 most courts have taken the view that marriage is a
unique legal arrangement, sometimes called a civil contract,219 deserving more thought
than strict adherence to traditional commercial contract law.220
These courts, however, were talking about marriage, 22 1 not engagements. 222 In a
peculiar decision, the New York Court of Appeals decided in 1874 that a breach of
marriage promise was clearly not a contract action within traditional and statutory
definitions.223 The case involved a challenge to a New York statute, which allowed
causes of action based on contract principles to survive death; the court determined the
statute did not apply in a breach of marriage promise case. 224 In distinguishing a
marriage promise from a contract as defined by the statute, the court determined that
the action scarcely resembles, in its main features, an action upon contract. In actions on
contract, the damages are limited by a fixed rule to the pecuniary loss sustained, while in
this the damages are in the discretion of the jury, to the same extent as in strictly personal
actions, such as slander, malicious prosecution, assault and battery and the like; and the
recovery may be, and usually is, principally for injured feelings, anxiety of mind, wounded
pride and blighted affections. 2 25
Viewed in light of the claim's origins and contract principles,226 this declaration
by the court presents a perplexing dichotomy; however, the contraction is clearly
alleviated, at least in New York, by the abolition of the cause of action.227 So while it
has been argued, and even admitted, that an engagement is not a regular contract in the
eyes of the law,228 it still maintains its firm roots in contract law principles in order to
229
hold parties liable in Georgia, and twenty-one other states.
B.

PolicingPre-MaritalPromises as BadPolicy

Arguably the most persuasive argument for abolishment lays in the public policy
concerns this cause of action raises.230 In the two states that have judicially eliminated

217. Id. at 211.
218. See id
219. Id at 210.
220. E.g. id. at 210-213; Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d at 1303. See generally Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract
ch. 6 (Stanford U. Press 1988).
221. Suprann. 212-220.
222. The Supreme Court has apparently never been faced with the issue of determining the rights or
obligations stemming from a promise to marry. Search in Westlaw, set library, using the search "promise
engagement & marriage & fundamental" (Nov. 13, 2008) (yielding 76 results); search in Westlaw, sct library,
using the search "breach & 'marriage promise' " (Nov. 13, 2008) (yielding 2 results).
223. Wade v. Kalbfleisch, 58 N.Y. 282, 285 (1874).
224. Id. at 284-285.
225. Id. at 285 (citations omitted).
226. Supra pt. II.
227. N.Y. Civ. Rights § 80-a (McKinney 1992).
228. E.g. Wade, 58 N.Y. at 285.
229. See Lord, supran. 9; supra n. 16 (listing the twenty-nine jurisdictions that have abolished the claim).
230. See e.g. Gilbert,987 S.E.2d at 774-776.
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the breach of marriage promise claim, 23 1 the overwhelming reason was concern over the
action's applicability in a modem legal system232 and its susceptibility to abuse. 233The
belief that this claim is subject to abuse stems from the fact that the party initiating the
lawsuit will undoubtedly be upset over the canceled nuptials, and most likely harboring
hurt feelings.234 The action has frequently been likened to a mere revenge tactic for the
broken-hearted female. 235
Courts and commentators also take the view that the nature of an engagement is
one of a preparation period before the binding commitment of marriage, which should
allow either party a reasonable opportunity to recognize when the decision to marry is
unsound.236 The Utah Supreme Court has supported this proposition, recognizing that
there is "no benefit in discouraging or penalizing persons who realize, before making
these vows, that for whatever reason, they are unprepared to take such an important
step."237 In addition to the possibility of abuse by would-be plaintiffs238 and the
common-sense notion of a non-binding preparatory period, 23 9 there are other persuasive
reasons underlying the rationale for abolition: the outdated makeup of the claim,240 and
the unavoidable gender bias the claim creates. 24 1
Older judicial opinions in breach of marriage promise cases reflect an oldfashioned, property-oriented242 view of both women and marriage, but this out-of-date
model has become "unworkable" in a modern legal system.243 Consider the complete
defense of the unchaste conduct of the (female) plaintiff.244 Consider, in at least one
instance, the attempted defense that the would-be bride "had some negro blood in her
veins."245 Consider also that the cause of action seems to have more relevance when
marriage is looked at from a property perspective,246 a viewpoint that has long since
been eradicated.247
231. Supra n. 16 (Kentucky and Utah).
232. Gilbert, 987 S.E.2d 772.
233. Jackson, 904 P.2d at 686.
234. See id.
235. E.g. Wright, supra n. 32, at 377.
236. E.g. Fierro,465 N.W.2d at 672; Jackson, 904 P.2d at 686; Wright, supra n. 32, at 369.
237. Jackson, 904 P.2d at 687 (emphasis in original).
238. Id. at 686.
239. Supra n. 26. One must also consider the social perceptions of an engagement, and the idea seemingly
imbedded in society that an engaged individual has an obvious right to "bail" before the wedding. Merely
consider cinematic history as an example: The Graduate(Embassy Pictures Corp. 1967) (motion picture); Far
From the Maddening Crowd (MGM 1967) (motion picture); It Had to be You (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1947)
(motion picture); Girl Shy (Harold Lloyd Corp. 1924) (motion picture). And, more recently, Made of Honor
(Columbia 2008) (motion picture); The Notebook (New Line Cinema 2004) (motion picture); Sweet Home
Alabama (D&D Films 2002) (motion picture); Serendipity (Miramax 2001) (motion picture); The Wedding
Planner(Columbia 2001) (motion picture); Runaway Bride (Paramount 1999) (motion picture); The Wedding
Singer (Juno Pix 1998) (motion picture). None of these films were followed with a sequel in which they
defended themselves in litigation (that is not, apparently, part of the magic of movie love).
240. Jackson, 904 P.2d at 686-687.
241. Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 775.
242. See Gring v. Lerch, 3 A. 841 (Pa. 1886).
243. Jackson, 904 P.2d at 687.
244. Winders, 9 S.E.2d at 132.
245. Van Houten, 38 N.E. at 705.
246. Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 773 (citations omitted); see generally Pateman,supra n. 220, at ch. 6.
247. See e.g. Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 775.
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In the past, courts have gone so far as to say that a husband is "entitled" 24 8 to a
healthy wife, as opposed to an "invalid," 249 and numerous cases discuss the affliction of
communicable and other diseases as a defense to an alleged breach. 250 In fact, the
physical and mental qualities of the bride have often been evaluated when courts analyze
these breach of promise claims,251 as a groom is apparently not required by contract to
"take an imperfect woman." 2 52
In one 1886 case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court compelled the defendant to
accept "defect[s]"253 which were easily observable without excessive investigation, but
seemed to promote a defense based on a latent, inoperable medical "defect," classifying
it as a fraud on the part of the female plaintiff.254 This defense was, of course, necessary,
as the defendant "was entitled to have a wife capable of copulation in the usual way." 25 5
The court likened the arrangement to the sale of a cow, analogizing that "it would be a
fraud to sell a cow with such a defect without making it known to the purchaser." 25 6 The
court further acknowledged a man's rights and expectations, because he obviously "does
not contract to marry a woman for the mere pleasure of paying her board and washing.
He expects and is entitled to something in return." 2 57
Recognizing a defense based on the female's chastity (or, more precisely, her lack
thereof) also seems extraordinarily archaic by today's social definitions.258 The apparent
logic behind placing such importance on a woman's sexual behavior seemingly derives
from her presumed place in society, her expected moral standards, and the unique
position she is in to bear children.259 However, the lack of acknowledgment of the
groom 's chastity not only emphasizes the "Victorian"26o notions of the claim in the
common law, but also reflects the inequality implicitly condoned by, and precipitated by,
this action.261
While the claim may not seem inherently biased on its face, one cannot ignore the
fact that there is no evidence a man has ever used this cause of action.262 So, for
practical purposes, 2 63 it appears only to be available to "jilted bride[s]." 264 One scholar
noted that while the claim is, of course, available to both sexes, "a man who would have

248. Shepler, 197 N.W. at 373.
249. Id (citation omitted).
250. See e.g. id
251. E.g. Gring, 3 A. 841.
252. Id at 843.
253. Id.
254. Id
255. Id.
256. Gring, 3 A. at 843.
257. Id.
258. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law From the
Regulation of Marriage,63 La. L. Rev. 243, 250 (Winter 2003).
259. Id.
260. Id
261. Id
262. See Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d. at 774; Wright, supra n. 32, at 370; but see Walker v. Hester, 198 S.W. 912
(Ky. App. 1917).
263. See Wright, supra n. 32, at 370 ("It is anomalous ... in that, while it is nominally available equally to
both sexes, it is practically of use to the woman only.").
264. Gurr, supra n. 3.
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the hardihood to essay such a remedy would be laughed out of court and out of
society." 26 5 While this sentiment may be overly harsh and not necessarily fair, perhaps it
is grounded in sound observations; the position of a spurned bride might still be
perceived differently266 in today's society, one that strives for an equal footing of the
sexes,267 than that of a rejected groom.
Even in the mere linguistic characterization of female plaintiffs by courts and
scholars, there is strong evidence of "sexism and paternalism."268 Plaintiffs alleging this
claim have historically been thought of in one of two ways: a woman "who has been
robbed of the priceless jewel of chastity and branded with a mark as indelible as the
mark of Cain, [against whom] the doors of real love and matrimony have doubtless been
closed"269 due to the "libidinous advances of the male sex,"270 or a woman who is
"indelicate, scheming, enterprising, and eager to seize upon a victim."271 So a woman,
whose fiancd has changed his mind, is either helpless272 or vengeful.273 It is arguable
whether true equality between the sexes currently exists, but surely our legal system
recognizes the modem advances and opportunities for women in society, and has drifted
away from these out-dated perceptions.274
One scholarly article, written in 1924, espouses the view better than any other that
women who make these allegations are immoral and vicious creatures, solely out for
revenge.275 The author includes this characterization of possible plaintiffs in his
explanation of the claim's intrinsic immorality, saying eloquently:
[I]n truth, a woman who really loves has nothing but kindness for the object of her
affections. Even very inferior women, so long as their own affections remain unimpaired,
will submit to the gravest injustice without retaliation. This is the feminine nature, because
love is so large a part of their being, and we say it in their honour. So long as a woman
loves, therefore, she will never pursue her forgetful lover with legal process for legal
retribution . . . . A lady of delicate feeling would die before she would [make such

claims] . . . amid all the glaring publicity of a court proceeding, the scowls and jeers of the
assembled country . . . . [I]s it not possible that the knowledge by women, that they have

this powerful weapon, is conducive to immorality?2 76
With such unequal perceptions of women underlying the historical analyses and
scholarly considerations of the action,277 the claim itself has come to adopt these
disparate images.
It should be noted that the abolishment of the breach of marriage promise claim
265. Wright, supra n. 32, at 370.
266. See e.g. Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 775 ("[O]ne could certainly debate whether equality has been achieved
between women and men in our society. . .
267. E.g. id.
268. Id.
269. Scharringhausv. Hazen, 107 S.W.2d 329, 337 (Ky. 1937).
270. Goodall v. Thurman, 1858 WL 2889 (Tenn. Dec. 1858).
271. Wright, supra n. 32, at 378.
272. Scharringhaus, 107 S.W. at 337.
273. Wright, supra n. 32, at 378.
274. See Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 775.
275. Wright, supra n. 32, at 377-379.
276. Id. at 377-378.
277. E.g. id.
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does not necessarily leave broken-hearted brides empty-handed, thereby burdening
deserving plaintiffs; separate causes of action may be available for pecuniary losses, or
even severe emotional distress. 27 8 And with so much baggage accompanying this claim,
it is unnecessary to continually validate such an antiquated action. 279
The scant arguments for retaining the cause of action were perfunctorily rejected in
the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision to abolish the cause of action.280 The court
addressed two arguments in favor of retention: that it was implicitly accepted by the
legislature when it placed a statute of limitations on the action, and that the concept of
stare decisis compelled retention.281 The court dismissed the first argument, holding that
it was irrelevant to the issue of retention whether or not the legislature had created a time
limit for the common law claim. 2 82 As to the second argument, the court recognized the
importance of stare decisis but stressed its authority to abolish common law actions that
are contrary to public policy. 283 Noting how strong the arguments were in favor of
abolition, and the lack of relevant arguments made in favor of retention,284 the court
used its authority to abolish the breach of marriage promise claim in Kentucky. 28 5
In 1942, the same Pennsylvania district court that questioned the constitutionality
of "anti-heart balm" legislation also presented arguments in favor of retaining causes of
action similar to the breach of marriage promise claim.286 The court did not accept the
reasoning that the statute was an attempt to curb actions brought in bad faith, claiming
that it is in the nature of judicial proceedings to determine which claims are meritorious,
and that any action could be brought in bad faith, not just the actions which had been
prohibited. 287
The court also argued that retention of the heart balm actions was pursuant to good
public policy, in that they provided relief for individuals who had been genuinely
wronged.288 The opinion went on to note that, in a democratic society, good public
policy means not closing the doors of the courts to the people, which could lead to
disrespect for the system and, ultimately, violence.289 The opinion, however, had no
effect; the issue of upholding the prohibition on the cause of action was not directly
before the court. 29 0

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

Jackson, 904 P.2d at 687.
See id.; Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d 772.
Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d at 775-776.
Id.
Id. at 776.
Id.
Id.
Gilbert, 987 S.W.2d 772.
Wilder, 43 F. Supp. at 729.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id
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Respecting Freedom to Marry and the FundamentalRight to Privacy: What Kind
29 1
ofInterest Does that Create? (I.e. This Claim is Unconstitutional!)
Even by its absence, law can shape culture in destructive ways.
-Francis Cardinal George 29 2

An interesting, but admittedly problematic, attack on the claim is a constitutional
one: perhaps we have the constitutional right to be free from civil liability when it comes
to a decision to marry. 293 In other words, is there a fundamental liberty interest at stake
in choosing a partner and being liable to them for damages294 when there has been a
breach of a marriage promise? The Ohio Court of Appeals made clear in Vrabel v.
Vrabel, a 1983 decision, that there is "no fundamental right to bring an amatory action"
when the constitutionality of an "anti-heart balm" act was questioned.295 It is evident
from other cases, too, that "anti-heart balm" acts will clearly pass constitutional
muster.296 My argument, however, presents the opposite proposition: while there is
clearly no fundamental, constitutional right to bring an action for breach of promise to
marry,297 is there a fundamental, constitutional right to befree from such an action? This
question requires an analysis of the constitutional protections afforded to individuals
based on the right to marry298 and the extent of a state's inherent right to regulate the
2 99
marital relationship.
The Fourteenth Amendment dictates that a state is unable to "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law." 300 The term "liberty" has
been judicially defined to encompass the fundamental right of privacy, including the
right to marry, the right to keep one's family together, the right to procreate, and the right
to raise children as one sees fit. 30 1 In 1967, in Loving v. Virginia,302 the Supreme Court
specifically acknowledged the fundamental right to marry, explaining that "the freedom
to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 303
That case challenged a state statute that prohibited interracial couples from
marrying, which the Court struck down as unconstitutional based on the Fourteenth
Amendment due process language (as well as on an equal protection argument).304
291. This section was inspired by the cases in and structure of Erwin Chemerinsky, ConstitutionalLaw ch. 8
(2d ed., Aspen 2005) and influenced by lectures given in Constitutional Law 11at the University of Tulsa
College of Law (Lyn Entzeroth, Classroom Lectures (Tulsa, Okla., Fall 2008)).
292. Spaht, supra n. 258, at 305 (Winter 2003) (quoting Francis Cardinal George, Law and Culture, I Ave
Maria L. Rev. 1, 12 (2003)).
293. Infra nn. 300-355.
294. E.g. Parker,28 S.E. at 400.
295. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d at 1305.
296. Supra pt. II,B.
297. Id.; e.g. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d at 1305.
298. See generally Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at ch. 8(c)(1).
299. E.g. Vrabel, 459 N.E.2d at 1305.
300. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
301. Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at ch. 8(c).
302. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
303. Id. at 12.
304. Id.
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While the case recognized the right to marry as fundamental, it also stands to support the
proposition that the choice of whom to marry is a fundamental right.305 After all, the
unconstitutional statute did not mandate that certain people were prohibited from
marrying altogether; the legislation was specifically aimed at prohibiting members of
different races from marrying each other, thereby not necessarily abridging the ability to
marry entirely, but, more accurately, denying an individual the freedom to choose a
marriage partner. 30 6
The Court elaborated on the right to marry further in 1978 when it opined that "it
would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of
family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that is the
foundation of the family in our society." 307 As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court
clearly affirmed that "the Due Process Clause protects personal decisions relating to
marriage." 308
From these interpretive Supreme Court decisions, it becomes obvious that not only
is marriage a fundamental right, 30 9 but the freedom of choice in the marriage decision is
also a fundamental right worthy of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 10
Additionally, it stands to reason that if the right to marry is a fundamental right afforded
constitutional protection, the right to not marry would also be a fundamental right worthy
of equivalent protection from state interference. 3 11 In Shell v. Gibbs, the defendant made
a choice not to marry a certain individual, for whatever reason. 3 12 If he has the ability to
choose to marry without fear of retribution, he must also have a protected interest in
choosing not to marry;313 Gibbs must have a constitutional right to remain a bachelor. 314
This is merely the first step in the analysis, however. 3 15 The existence of a
fundamental right must be coupled with unconstitutional government infringement of
that right in order to create unconstitutional conduct for which the state could be
liable.316 This part of the analysis is problematic for a few reasons, the first of which
being that the state has an unequivocal right to regulate the marriage relationship, 3 17 and
the second being the possible difficulty in identifying a state actor (the only party against

305. Id. at 12 ("The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by
invidious racial discrimination. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another
race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.").
306. Id. at 4-5.
307. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (emphasis added).
308. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 559 (2003) (citations omitted).
309. Suprann. 301-308.
310. However, any protection of a fundamental right may be abridged by demonstrating that a restriction is
compelling and necessary (Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at 820), as in the case of marriage between relatives or
minors. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring).
311. Compare cf Skinner v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that the right to procreate is fundamental)
with Griswoldv. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that an individual has a fundamental right to obtain birth
control, thereby preventing procreation).
312. See PI.'s Compl., supra n. 6.
313. Supran.311.
314. Id.
315. Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at 819.
316. Id.
317. See e.g. Calhfano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 53-54 (1977); Hanfgarn, 8 N.E.2d 47.
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whom a constitutional claim can be made)318 when the only action being done by a state
is inaction, i.e. allowing the common law claim to survive in courts. 3 19
The second issue (the state actor requirement) can be first analyzed in light of
Shelley v. Kraemer,320 a 1948 Supreme Court decision which held that the state's act of
recognizing and enforcing racially-discriminative restrictive covenants was sufficient to
constitute state action. 32 1 While this declaration by the Court may seem clearly
dispositive, it "long has been controversial, ,,322 and has never been extended to the outer
edges of its linguistic limitations. 323
A better argument for identifying a state actor in the recognition of a common law
claim is found in 1964's New York Times v. Sullivan.324 There, the Supreme Court held
without hesitation that Alabama was a state actor when it applied common law rules to
private parties in a libel case, allowing First Amendment restrictions to be placed on
private individuals.325 The Court declared,
although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a
state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their
constitutional freedoms.. .. It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action
and that it is common law only.326
Noting the Court's willingness, in certain circumstances, to conclude that state inaction
is equivalent to action, 327 it seems likely that a state's mere judicial recognition of a
common law claim such as breach of promise to marry would readily be classified as
state action. 328
The more difficult component of the infringement argument, however, is the
determination of the extent to which a state can regulate or interfere with the
fundamental right to marry (or not marry). 32 9 There is no question that a state can
regulate most aspects of legal marriage.330 In fact, the state even has the power to
prohibit marriage in some instances, as in the case of marriage between siblings. 33 1 The
Court has made very clear that not every "state regulation which relates in any way to the
incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny," 332 and
"reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the
318. Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at 469.
319. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at 489 (citing Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 Hary. L. Rev. 1, 29 (1959)).
323. Id. at 490.
324. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
325. Id. at 265.
326. Id.
327. Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at 489.
328. See Shelley, 334 U.S. 1; N. Y Times, 376 U.S. 254.
329. See generally Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at 826-827 (explaining the Supreme Court's treatment of a
state's right to regulate the marital relationship). "Lines inevitably must be drawn and the Court is
understandably reluctant to second-guess the legislature unless there is discrimination against a suspect class or
a clear infringement of fundamental rights." Id. at 827.
330. E.g. Zablocki, 434 U.S. 378; Calfano, 434 U.S. at 53-54.
331. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., concurring).
332. Id. at 386 (majority).
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marital relationship may legitimately be imposed." 333
Under this standard, the state's action of recognition and enforcement must be "a
direct and substantial interference" 334 with the ability to marry and the freedom to
choose a partner. In this instance, it must be determined whether the state's recognition
of this common law claim "significantly interfere[s] with decisions to enter into the
marital relationship." 335 Only then will the government's judicial recognition and
enforcement be subject to strict scrutiny, meaning the state must provide a compelling
and necessary reason for allowing the claim to survive.336 If a court cannot find a
substantial infringement of an individual's right to marry in holding him liable for a
breached marriage promise, then the government need only show a rational basis for
allowing the claim, which generally is not a difficult standard to meet 337 (perhaps the
traditional integrity of the common law and stare decisis338).
Califano v. Jobst presented the Supreme Court with the issue of determining
whether or not there had been a substantial infringement on an individual's right to
marry when, under certain Social Security provisions, disabled children's benefits were
terminated at the time they married.3 39 In upholding the legislation, the Court
emphasized that even when a law may discourage people from getting married or burden
people who do choose to get married, it does not necessarily render the law an invalid
exercise of the state's power. 340 In essence, discouraging an individual from exercising a
fundamental right is not necessarily infringement and will not always be an
unconstitutional act. 34 1
However, in the case of the existence of breach of promise claims, not only might
an individual be discouraged342 from marrying, but he may also be on the receiving end
of a lawsuit which subjects him to civil liability (amounting to punishment).343 To an
individual like Gibbs, not only does the common law discourage him from making a
promise to marry in the future, it also imposes a certain amount of punishment 344 for
making, or unmaking, personal decisions about whom to marry, before a legally-binding
marriage commitment has even been entered into. Civil liability in this instance
resembles punishment 34 5 because the award may exceed actual pecuniary damages, 34 6
thus imposing an affirmative, intrusive, and unwarranted obligation, as opposed to a

333. Id.
334. Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at 826.
335. Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386.
336. Chemerinsky, supra n. 291, at 820.
337. Id.
338. See Gilbert,987 S.W.2d at 775.
339. Chemerinksy, supra n. 291, at 826.
340. Califano, 434 U.S. at 54 ("The general rule is not rendered invalid simply because some persons who
might otherwise have married were deterred by the rule or because some who did marry were burdened
thereby.").
341. Id.
342. Stanardv. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 98 (Wash. 1977).
343. See id. at 96; Wright, supra n. 32, at 374-375.
344. Wright, supran. 32, at 374-375.
345. Id.
346. E.g. Parker,28 S.E. at 400.
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mere deterrent. 347
Surely this claim constitutes an invalid "attempt to interfere with the individual's
freedom to make a decision as important as marriage,"348 and would directly and
substantially interfere with that constitutionally-protected right. 34 9 If the argument can
be made that imposing liability upon an individual for breaking an engagement attempts
to restore injuries that resulted in emotional and financial damage, 350 a more significant
35 1
trumps a
argument can be made that the constitutionally-recognized right to privacy
352
Short of Georgia
state's interest in protecting its citizens from emotional injury.
offering a compelling and necessary reason 353 for allowing the common law claim of a
breach of marriage promise to survive in the modem age, allegedly bad boyfriends (or
fianc6s) like Gibbs354 must have some protected liberty interest355 worthy of immunity
for their acts of terminating an engagement, no matter how insensitive.
V.

THE END OF THE AISLE: CONCLUSIONS

Elections are a good deal like marriages, there is no accountingfor taste. Every
time we see a bride groom, we wonder why she ever picked him-and it's the same with
public officials.
35 6
-Will Rogers
Wayne Gibbs was held legally accountable, and financially liable, for his personal
choice not to get married. 3 57 Although one may disagree with his romantic decision, as
Ms. Shell certainly did,358 his right to make that choice should be legally protected,
whether through legislative measures or judicial action. 359 Abolition of this common law
claim reflects both the modernization of our legal system360 and beneficial public policy
choices. 36 1
While there is a compelling public interest in abolishing the breach of marriage
promise cause of action because of the out-dated notions of gender inequality362 and the
distinctions from traditional contracts, 363 there is also a strong argument in favor of
individual autonomy; namely, that every person has a fundamental right to choose whom
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to marry without fear of legal retribution or liability. 364 The apparent lack of any
persuasive argument for keeping this claim acts as evidence that the claim is unnecessary
and "unworkable" in a modem legal system.365 Gibbs' hope must lie either in the
Georgia courts, that they will recognize the modem illegitimacy of this claim,366 or in
the state legislature, that it may craft statutory bars367 to claims of the broken-hearted.
-Kelsey M May

364. Supra pt. IV, C.
365. Jackson, 904 P.2d at 686.
366. Supra pt. IV.
367. Id.
* Student at the University of Tulsa College of Law, J.D. expected May 2010. 1began this article with the
expectation that I would support Ms. Shell and her cause of action. After all, what else does a "jilted" woman
want but revenge? Along the way, however, I recognized the discrepancy between emotional pain and legal
revenge; while there may be a need for restitution, it should not be imposed with a state's assistance. Special
thanks to everyone who read and edited my paper, including Professor Ray Yasser of the University of Tulsa.
Thanks also to my law school mentor Wayne Cooper for constant support and encouragement.
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